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ln the Supre01e Court of the
State of Utah

WILMA W. WOO'ITON,
)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA.
Defendant and Appellant.

CASE
)I

NO. 10108

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Respondent adopts appellant's statement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent adopts appellant's statement.
STATEMENT OF FAc.r8

The respondent believes that the appellant's statement
of facts is substantially correct. The respondent, however,
would add that the insurance agent, Mr. Bowen, was a
long time friend and acquaintance of the decedent and was
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well aware of his condition and physical disability.
(Bowen Dep. P. 9)

(R. 31)

The respondent would further add that a full premium
including the added cost for the accidental death rider was
paid by the respondent. (R. 17) Another salient fact is
that at the time of making the application, September 24,
1962, the respondent did not know (and does not now know,
if such is the case) that her husband, Harold, had ever
seen Dr. C. M. Smith, Jr. prior to the date of application.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE RECORD DISCLOSES NO GENUINE ISSUE
OF MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THIS CONDITION
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
It is apparently the position of the appellant that so
long as there is a material issue of fact, summary judgment cannot be granted. The appellant's entire brief is
related to the fact question as distinguished from the law
question. Although we do not admit that there is a material issue of fact and, on the contrary, believe that there
is no substantial or material issue of fact, the respondent
respectfully contends that the respondent is entitled to
judgment on the pleadings. A summary perusal of the
answer shows that the only defense raised by the appellant is that it was "induced to enter into the insurance
contract with plaintiff and plaintiff's deceased husband by
reason of intentional misrepresentation of materials facts
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Fraud is the only basis upon which the appellant can
be relieved of its obligation under the policy. The appellant has completely and utterly failed to plead fraud with
the pruticularity required by the statute. Rule 9 (b) ~
quires fraud and the circumstances of fraud to be pleaded
\fith particularity. This has not been done. See A. W.
Sewell v. Commercial Casualty Insurance Company, 80
Utah 37H: 15 Pac 2d., 327; Davis Stock Company v. Hill,
2 Utah 2d, 20; 268 Pac 2d, 988.
In this respect, the Court will note that the appellant
has failed to plead that the misrepresentation, if one was
made. \Vas relied upon. The appellant has failed to allege
\vith particularity the circumstances of the said fraud, setting forth the alleged ·misrepresentation and pleading the
rnateriaHty or reliance upon said representation. The
Davis case states that the materiality of the allegations

must be alleged in the pleading with certainty; otheTWise,
there is no raising of the issue of fraud. The Davis case

also states that the materiality of. a false representation
cannot be ascertained unless the true f:act is alleged with
particularity. Here the appellant has failed to allege the
tnte fact which it supposedly relies upon. See Stuck v.
Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah, 495; 227 Pac.
791. The last citation sets forth the elements of an anegation in fraud necessary to be pleaded under the Utah
Statutes. The Court will note that the appellant has failed .
to make an allegation in fraud sufficient to give it a def<-'nse.

Even assuming the pleadings were sufficient to state
a claim. the respondent respectfully contends that notwithstanding the arguments made in appellant's Point I, there
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could not possibly be a misrepresentation. The language
of the application is clear. Appellant contends that the
misrepresentation was made in respondent's answer to questions 5, 6 and 7. These questions and answers are specifically set forth as follows:
5.

Have you or any f-amily dependent members, :ever
had or received medical advice or treatment for
(circle condition Answer Yes if yes to .any part of
5)
(f) Any other sickness, injury or defect? (Give
Name)
.Harold-Polio at .age ·of 3
Yes

·6. If Yes to any part of question 5, complete the followitlg for ·each circled condition:
Person-A-Polio at age of 3 yrs. Has slight.lim.p.
Still under doctors .care?-No.
Name and address of doctor who was in attendance
Dr. is deceaSed.
Complete Recover-No Recurrence
7.

To the .best of your knowledge are you and all.famUy dependent members now in good health and
free from any physical defect injury or disease
and are not now under medical care?
Yes.

The language and handwriting was that of the agent
and not of the applicant or the insured. The claimed misrepresentation appears to be that the application said that
Harold Wootton had polio at the .age of three, that he had
a slight limp resulting ·therefrom and that he had completely
recovered from the said condition.
'11he .appellant finds the inconsistency of the answer
to queStiori' 6 a "misrepresentation." We respectfully .say
that where the insw~nce ·company was infonned that the
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insw·ed had been afflicted with polio, that he had recovered

but that the polio had left him with a limp, to further say
in the same sentence that he was in good heal~h and free
from physical defect is not a misrepresentation.
The fact is that the company and its agent were completely informed as to the limitation of the insured. It
was for this reason that they attached a rider to the policy
eliminating coverage from "poliomyelitus or residual paTalysis" and stamped the policy on the face of it, in red,
··NOTICE! SEE ELIMINATION RIDER ATrACHED TO
TillS POLICY".

1,he appellanrt does not contend by its Point I, its
pleading or its argument that Mrs. Wootton, tJhe applicant,
kne\v, if such were the case, that Mr. Wootton had been
to see a Dr. Smith in July of 1962. It does not contend
that she made any intentional misrepresentation of fact.
It admitted in its argument to the trial court that they had
no evidence that she knew of any limitation of her husband, other than the polio mentioned in the application.
The depositions taken by the appellant fail to show any
knowledge on the part of Mrs. Wootton different than that
sho\\rn in the application. There could not, therefore, be
any misrepresentation by the applicant.
The appellant at no time talked with the decedent concerning his disability or condition of health. It is also interesting to note that the insurance company never made
any effort to contact the decedent concerning his health
or knmvn disability. It would seem that the appellant
should be estopped from claiming misrepresentation under
these circumstances.
.L\uthorities that establish that ambiguities in an in-
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surance contract are to be construed against the insurance
company:

-29 Am. Jur 640 to 650 and Sec. 258 to 264.
Gressler v. New York Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah 182, 163
P2d 374.
Browing v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 72 P2d
1060, 94 Utah 532.
Richards v. Standard Accid. Ins. Co., 200 P. 1017, 58
Utah 622.
POINT IT
STATEMENTS MADE IN AN APPLICATION FOR
INSURANCE ARE REPRESENTATIONS NOT WARRANTIES.
Utah Code Annotated 31-22-1(4):
"A provision that the policy shall constitute the entire
contract between the parties and that all statements
made by the insured shall, in the absence of fraud,
be deemed representations and not warranties and that
no such statement or statemeents shall- be used in defense of a claim under_ the policy unless contained in
a vmtten application therefor and a copy of such application shall be endorsed upon or attached to the policy
when issued."
Because appellant has cited the last sentence of the
first para~aph of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 31-19-8,
we deem it necessary that the entire provision be cUed:
"31-19-8. Materiality of misrepresentations - Warranties - Presumptions and burden of proof. - (1) Except
as provided in subsection (2), no oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of
an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf,
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the contract or prevent it attaching, unless such misrepresen·
tation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive.
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The insured shall have the burden of proof that
such misrepresentation or warranty was not made with
intent to deceive.
(2) In any application for life or disability insurance made in writing by the insured, all statements
therein made by the insured shall, in the absence of
fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties.
The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the
right to recovery under the contract unless it materially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed by tlhe insurer.
As argued in Point I, we believe that it is obvious
that there was and could be no misrepresentation under
the application. This is especially true in light of the Interrogatories and Ans\vers. (R. 9, 13)

"2. State in detail the misrepresentation of material
facts alleged in paragraph 7 of tlhe answer, and in this
regard set forth who made the misrepresentation, how
it was made, when it was made, and before whom it
was made.
A. It \vas represented by plaintiff that the only sickness,, injury or defect of the deceased was that he had
polio at the age of three years, that he had a slight
limp at that time, that there was no recurrence of any
difficulty, and that there had been a complete recovery
from said condition. It was further represented that
the deceased was not at that time under any doctor's
care for such condition. Said representations were
made by plaintiff, were made orally and in writing,
made on September 24, 1962, and were made in the
presence of \Veston Cordner and Albert Bowen.
3.

State in what way the representation made did
not conform with the tn1th.
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A. On July 13, 1962, the deceased was seen by Dr.
Charles M. Smith, Jr., of Pro~o, Utah. The doctor
found that there was an increasing weakness in the
left leg and greatly diminished muscle power. Prior
to this time, the deceased .had noticed a great tendency
for falling. The doctor advised him that because of
this continuous falling, he should re·tire from his occupation. This the deceased did in July, 1962, for
the reason that his leg was continually causing him
trouble."
The answer to Interrogatory 2 indicates that the appellant is relying partially on an oral representation. This
cannot be a basis f.or defense under Utah Code Annotated
31-22-1(4) cited above.
If the appellant is relying on a written representation,
then it must be the answer to question 6 of the application
(R .. 17) which is partially set forth under A. 2 above. If
this. is. so, and there can be no other conclusion under these
interrogatories and answers, then there could be no misrepresentation for A. 3 sets forth the alleged true fact. Let
us analyze the claimed misrepresentation as compared to

the claimed trurtJh.
Representation A. 2

Truth A. 3

1.

Polio at age 3

1.

Not denied

2.

Had a slight limp

2.

Nort denied

3. No recurrence of diffi-

3. Not denied

culty (polio)
4.

Had been complete reoovery from condition
(polio)

4.

Not denied
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Th(' appellant's answer number 3 does not negate any
of the represPntations claimed Wlder Answer number 2.
It only adds some superfluous allegations, to-wit:

(1) That the deceased had seen Dr. Charles M.
Smith, Jr., on July 13, 1962. This does not impugn the
answers to the application. Suppose he had. It does not
pro\rt. that he, on September 24, 1962, was under and doctor's care or that the applicant, Mrs. Wootton, knew that
he \Vas, or even that she knew he had seen the doctor on
that date. if he did.
That he had a tendency for falling. This was
knO\vn to the insurance company on September 24, 1962.
They knew he had a defective leg and limped. Bowen knew
he had this physical disabiliy. (R. 31)
(2)

(3) That the doctor advised him to retire ·because of
his tendency to fall. This he did in July, 1962. This was
before the application. What difference did it make to the
appellant \Vhy he ·retired. Mrs. Wootton in her deposition
explained \vhy he retired. (R. 32, Wootton Dep. P. 14)
It is obvious that there was no misrepresentation. For
sake of argument, even if there was, how could anything
therein represented be deemed material, fraudulent or have
materiality affected the acceptance of risk or hazard assumed by the company?

POINT ill
UNDER THE UTAH STATIJTE, AN INSURER, IN

ORDER TO AVOID . ~
. POLICY ON GROUNDS OF
FALSE STATEMENT OR MISREPRESENTATIONS,
MUST SHOW THAT SAID STATEMENTS WERE MA-
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TERIAL AND THAT THEY WERE MADE KNOWINGLY
AND WITH INTE·NT TO DECEIVE OR DEFRAUD.
In this case, the application for rthe policy was filled

out by the agent in his handwriting setting down the answers to questions asked by him and answered by Mrs.
Wootton. See deposition of Albert Bowen, page 7. (R.
31) On page 8 of that deposition, he testifies as follows:
· "Q. · Now, in respect to No. 6, Question No. 6, what
was the purpose of this notation? The notation is:
'Polio ~at age three years, has slight limp. Not under
doctor's care. And the doctor is deceased. Complete recxwery. No recurrence.' What was your understanding of that phrase?
A. Well, we wanted to let the Company know that
Harold walked with a limp, and the reason he walked
with a limp is because he had polio when he was
younger, but that his poUo had not recurred and that
he was fully recovered, other than the limp.
Q. By 'fully recovered' did you mean whether he then
had polio that was wocking on him, or if the polio had
ceased to be active?
A. I meant that the polio had ceased to be active.
It wasn't borthering him any more now than it had for
the rest of his life.
Q. But you knew he had polio that had caused a liinitation in his physical ability?
A. Yes. I never knew why he limped unrtil she answered this question under 5 (f), that he had had
polio. As long as I had known him he had Umped. And
she said he had had it at age three.
Q.· Did you tell her there would be any reduction in
coverage because of that in the policy?
A. We didn't know if the Company at this time
would exclude polio or not. This is always up to the
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company. They can usually charge an additional premium and cover it if they want. But the policy came
back with an exclusion of polio.

"Q. Now, do you know of any representation or statement to you that was in fact false?
A. No. We asked the questions on the application.
I asked the questions on the application just as they
are written there, and we answered them just as she
gave us the answers. And I am aware that the application becomes a part of the policy, and so it has
to be as right as it can be.
Q. Well, as far as you know are there any false statements in that application?
A. No, there isn't any that I know about. Every
question that is here 1:hat has been asked has been
answered truthfully.''

After looking at the deposition Of Mr. Bowen and the
particular extracts cited above, we refer the Court to the
deposition of Mrs. Wootton. The particular portions of
the depositions we believe are pertinent to the defendant's
contention are:
"Q. Well, do you know whether he saw a doctor within a year prior to the time of his death or prior to the
time this was signed?
A. I don't know. I am sure he - ·he seen a doctor.
I don't know how to answer a question like that. I
don't honestly know if he seen doctors or not. I go
to the doctor without telling him. I have went to the
doctor withoot telling him I had been to a doctor.
Q. Do you know that he saw Doctor Charles M.
Smith, Jr., on July 13, 1962?
A. I don't
1
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Q. You don't even know that today?
A. I ihave heard that he did since that time, yes.
Q. When did Harold terminate his emplo~ent with
the Provo River Water Users?
A. In July.
Q. Would that have been on July 15th?
A. That he terminated?
Q. Yes.
A. I think it was July 15th.
Q. W1hy did he terminate?
A. Well, I don't exactly lmow why he terminated,
other than the chang~over on the job up there. The
job was too much for him.
Q. Did you and he discuss it?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you discuss why the job was too much for
him?
A. Yes. When he first went up there ,he had control o¥er the power house. That is all he had to do.
And then they put him in charge of rthe chlorinating
station ·and house cleaning and cutting the lawns. And
in his condition he couldnt hold his end up.
Q. You say, 'in his condition'. What was there about
his condition?
A. This condition existed then.''
1

The Court will recall that the application was made
on September 24, 1962, and the premium paid. The insured, Harold Wootton, died on December 31, 1962, as a
result of injuries sustained in an automobile-pedestrian accident. The contention of the appellant is that the application was false beeause on December 3, 1962, Mrs. Wootton made a statement that her husband had been advised
by Dr. Smith that "he might lose his good leg if he didn't
stay off of it." Presumably, the insurance company be-
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lieve; that this statement is proof that she lmew at the
time of the application that he had been to see a doctor
and that his health was poor, or that his condition was bad,
and that if she had been truthful, they would not have insural. T'he respondent respectfully contends that this allegi.~ statement does not say that, and when read as stated
in the deposition, says the absolute contrary. The stat~
n1ent is incapable of even suggesting the conclusion proposed by the appellant. Mrs. Wootton's explanation of the
ans\ver made to the insur'dllce claim questionaire an January 9, 1963, was based upon information that she had
learned since the date of the application. See her deposition, page 13, line 19, (R. 32), as set forth above. This
con1pletely refutes any suggestion that she ·had made an
intentional misrepresentation. But even if it were intentional, the respondent respectfully states that it was not

material.
The leading case in U·tah on this point is Chadwick
v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 54 Utah, 443; 191
P., 448. In this case, plaintiff, the insured's wife, was seeking to collect the proceeds from a policy on the Hfe of her
deceased husband. The insurance company admitted the
allegations of the complaint but alleged rthat the deceased
husband had made false and fraudulent statements in his
aJlS\vers to questions asked in the application, to-wit:
"Q. Give name and address of physician last consulted.
A. None.
Q. Are you in gocxl health as far as you know or believe?
A. Yes."
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Testimony at the trial indicated that the husband was
under a physician's care in Wyoming and that he was
sufefring from severe back pain at this time. The trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant insurance company. Plaintiff appealed. The ~Supreme Court, in its opinion, had the following to say:
"The issuance of a policy by the defendant was admitted. The burden was on the defendant to void the
poUcy by proving that it was procured b~ fraud It
was not sufficient merely to prove that the deceased
made false answers to questions propounded by the
medical examiner. Irt was incumbent upon the defendant to prove that the answers were not only untrue,
but that the deceased knew or should have known
them to be untrue. The question of good faith on the
part of the insured by the defendant's answers is made
the very gist of the controversy. Respectable authority can be found maintaining the view that false statements made ,and false answers given by the insured
in his application for insurance concerning matte·rs material to the risk will void the policy irrespective of
the question of good faith or honest belief on the part
of the insured, but as we have already shown when
stating defendant't theory of the case, the issue here
presented by the defendant is that the insured not
only made false statements respecting his health at
the time of applying for insurance and false answers
relating thereto, but is alleged that at ·the vecy time
he knew that they were false. In view of our statute
and the cases we shall hereinafter cite, we are inclined
to the view that in a case of this kind where an insurance company relies upon false statements and answers of the insured as a defense against an action on
the policy, it must not only allege, as the defendant has
done in this case, that that statements and answers are
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Wltrue, but also that the insured knew or should have
known them to be untrue at the time he made them.
Not only this, but as a necessary corollary in judicial
proceedings the truth of such allegations should be
substantially established at the trial."
Another Utah case dealing with this point is New
York Life Insurance Company v. Grow, 135 P. 2d, 120.
Plaintiff insurance company in this case instituted an action to cancel the policy because of false statements and
misrepresentations made by the defendant's deceased ·husband in his answers to questions concerning his medical
history. Testimony at trial is replete with evidence that ·
the husband knew that he had a rheumatic heart condition and yet when questioned on such matter by the agent
of the insurance company, he made no mention of this
fact The Court said:
"It was the burden of the plaintiff to esta!blish actual
fraud on the part of insured that he made the material misrepresentations shown by the application knowingly and with intent .to deceive and defraud the plaintiff insurance company. This it failed to do."

The Court then quotes approval f.rom a case of Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 97 F.2d, 583;
108 F. 2d, 902. This was a case in the Federal Court which
dealt with an interpretation of Utah Law concerning material misrepresentations in an insurance applicatiOn.
"By this decision Utah is committed to the liberal doctrine that before misrepresentations of material facts
will void a policy of insurance, ·it must be established
that they were not only knowingly made, but also wilfully and intentionally, with intent to deceive and defraud."
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See Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v.
Middlemiss, 135 P. 2d, 275. Here the Court made a definition of material representation:
"A material representation is one which ordinarily
would influence a prudent insurer in determining
whether to accept oc reject one risk, or in fixing the
amOWlt of premium in the event of such acceptance,
or in excepting some risk or part thereof from coverage.''

Also quoting from the Zolintakis case above, the Court
said:

"A material fact is any fact, the knowledge or ignorance of which would naturally influence the insurer's
judgment in making the contract, in estimating the
degree and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate
of insurance."
To void the policy the insurer must have relied on the
misrepresentation.
29 Am. Jur., 966, Section 705:
"The rule that the intentional misrepresentation by the
applicant of a material fact relied on by the insurer
permits the latter to avoid the policy is not applicable
where the insurer cannot be held to have relied thereon, having had actual knowledge of the true facts or
of the falsity of the applicant's statements, or at least
sufficient indications that would have put a prudent
man on notice and caused him to start an inquiry
which, if carried out with reasonable thoroughness,
would have revealed the truth. Thus, an insurer cannot ~claim a misrepresentation as to facts of which he
is fully informed, and if the expressions are ambiguous, the insurer should clear up the ambiguity by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
asking for an explanation, and not by substituting its
o\vn conjectures therefor."
See New York Life Insurence Company v. Strudel,
243 F. 2d. 90, where it is said that the general rule is:

"That the intentional misrepresentations by an applicant of a matetial fact relied on by the insurer, the
latter to void the policy, however, there are exceptions. If the insurer has actual knowledge of the
truth or at least has sufficient indications that would
have put a prudent man on notice and would have
caused him to start an inquiry, which if carried out
\vith reasonable thoroughness would reveal the truth,
cannot blind himself to the true facts and used to N'ly on the misrepresentations.''
See Peterson v. ·Manhattan Life Insurance ·Company,
91 N.E. 466. Here the insured answered a question in the
negative when asked if he ·had been sick ·in the last ten
years; ho\vever, in another part of the application it ·was
clearly shown that he had malaria within this particular
period of time, therefore, the ·Court held that the insurance company had knowledge of the insured's physical condition and said:
''An insurance company cannot .insist upon forfeiture
of an insurance policy for a cause of which it had
knowledge when it issued the policy."

In the instant case, even the misrepresentations the
defendant contend that the .plaintiff made did not amount
to fraud. Plaintiff cites to the Court questions 2 and 3
set forth in Point II above.
From the answers to .interrogatories, read in the light
of the cases cited above, the respondent respectfully con-
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tends that there is no defense to the respondent's claim for
paymenJt. The appellant does not contend fraud based upon its answers.

POINT IV
AN AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE GAINED WITHIN
THE ORDINARY SCOPE O·F illS DUTIES WILL BE
IMPUTED TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY.
The respondent contends that the appellant knew of
the :physiCal condition of the insured, Harrod Wootton, and
that the knowledge of the agent is imputed to the appellant. · The agent's knowledge is detailed in his deposition,
page 3, line 23, to page 5, line 2. (R. 31)
A-_ Utah case. dealing with this point is Farrington v.
Granite State Fire Insurance Company of Portsmouth, et
al., 232 P. 2d, 754. This action concerned -four identical
fire insurance poJ.icies issued by the defendants to the
plaintiff on the same building, which building was de- .
stroyed by fire. The Court said:
''The insuranee companies adopted and took the benefits of all ihis conduct favorable to them. It seems
. quite inconsistent for them to accept the advantages of
everything he did for their benefit and yet insist that
they are not responsible for the knowledge he acquired
aJbout the building within the necessary and ordinary
scope of ~his duties in handling the transaction. From
the facts . stated he was their agent and they are
charged with his lmowledge."
'11he fact that an agent's knowledge ls his principal's
knOwldge is particularly important when considered in regard to the situation where the agent interviews the in-
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sured and fills in the application blank as he, the agent,
asks qut."'Stions of the insured. Certainly, any knowledge
of material fact which the agent gathers at this time will
be imputed to the insurance company unless there is collusion between the agent and the insured.
See Turner v. Mutual Beneficial Health and Accident
Association, 24 N.W. 2d, 534. Here an accident and
health policy, which provided for a death benefit from accident, was issued to the insured. The agent, in filling out
the application, merely asked questions of the insured and
futnished answers from his own observation. The insurance company now claims that false statements were made
in the application, to-wit: The insured walked with a limp
and had a short arm. The court held that no intent to deceive was shown and that apparently the insured assumed
that the agent understood the situation and that she was
capable of filling out the application properly. There was
some question as to whether the insured read the application before signing it, thus the court said that even if
the insured did read the application before signing it, he
might logically conclude that the agent understood the interpretation placed by the company on the questions in
the application and thus have written them accordingly.
The burden is on the insurance company to show intent
to deceive. The court also said that the knowledge of the
agent on a material matter required within the scope of
the agent is imputed to the principal.

See also annotation in 81 A.L.R., 833 and supplemental annotations in 117 A.L.R., 790 and 148 A.L.R., 507.
This ruu1otation is entitled "Insertion by Insurer's Agent in
Application of False Answers to Questions Correctly An-
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swered by Insured or Answers Suggested by Agent." In
either situation the lmowledge of the agent is imputed to
the insurer and, therefore, the insurer is unable to void
the policy because of such false misrepresentations.
The Utah Case of Bednarek v. Brothevhood of American Yeomen, 48 Utah, 67; 157 Pac., 884, is cited in support of this majority rule.. The annotation says:

"The great weight of authority is that if an application
for instu'ance is drawn by an agent of the insurer who
fills in false answers to the interrogation contained
therein which are truthfully answered by the insured
without fraud, collusion or actual lmowledge of the
insured or the eocistence of circumstances from which
constructive ·knowledge of suoh falsity might be imputed to 'him, the insurer cannot rely upon the falsity
of such answers in seeking to avoid liability under the
policy issued upon the application." .
Where the agent suggests answers or construes questions, the annotation says:
"The act of the insurer's agent in assuming to interpret
the questions in the application and to advise the insured of the propriety or necessity of recording certain
answers amounts to an interpretation of the questions
and answers by the insurer himself~"
CONCLUSION

The respondent respectfully urges the Court · to sustain the trial court's judgment. The respondent believes
that there is no defense raised by the appellant's pleading;
that there was in fact no misrepresentation; that the Urtah
Statute excludes any miSrepresentation except that contained in the application, and that a misrepresentation, to
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l)(_• grolUlds for avoidance of an obligation must be material

and amount to fraud, and that such must be pleaded with
particularity as required by the Statute. Under the circwnstances of this case. the respondent respectfully submits that swnmary judgment is the appropriate relief.
Respectfully'

s/ Jackson B. Howard
Jackson B. Howard, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent
20 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah
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